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I. INTRODUCTION 
Any understanding or review of adoption law in the United 
States, and in Minnesota in particular, must begin with a 
recognition that adoption law by its very nature is a melding of 
social and ethical views of society with respect to children, with 
prevailing legal complexities and attitudes.  The legal decisions 
made in adoption cases and described in State and Federal statutes 
must, of necessity, involve consideration of “children’s best 
interests.”1  That consideration of societal views of children and 
 
       †  Wright S. Walling graduated from the University of Minnesota Law 
School in 1972.  He is a founding partner of the law firm of Walling, Berg & 
Debele, P.A.  He is a past President of the American Academy of Adoption 
Attorneys and a 2004 winner of the Angels in Adoption award from the 
Congressional Coalition on Adoption.  Mr. Walling currently serves on the Board 
of Directors of the North American Council on Adoptable Children.  He focuses 
his practice in all areas of juvenile and family law. 
 1. See source cited infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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legal principles goes well beyond the question of legal and statutory 
interpretation, involving implications as well as reflections of how 
society decides to view its children and to create and define 
families.  It reflects society’s view of how families are created, how 
they are disciplined, how they are maintained, and how they are 
defined. 
This reflection of the melding of issues involving law and 
society requires only the view of the attempts by various 
practitioners to define their role in the adoption process.  These 
attitudes are reflected on one side by the Code of Ethics of the 
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys2 and on the other side 
by the Standards issued by the Child Welfare League of America.3  
By comparing these approaches, one can see the continuing 
struggle and simmering tension between the two worlds of law and 
social work. 
Given the complexity of the broader societal context in which 
adoption practice now occurs, it is especially important to reaffirm 
the fundamental values that provide a framework for professional 
adoption services.  The core values listed below form the 
foundation for the ethical development and delivery of adoption 
services. 
 
• All children have a right to receive care, protection, 
and love. 
 
• The family is the primary means by which children are 
provided with the essentials for their well-being. 
 
• The birth family constitutes the preferred means of 
providing family life for children. 
 
• When adoption is the plan for a child, the extended 
family should be supported as the first option for 
adoption placement, if appropriate. 
 
 
 2. American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, Code of Ethics, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 43, 43–44 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger 
eds., 2004), available at http://www.adoptionattorneys.org/information/ethics_ 
code.htm. 
 3. Child Welfare League of America, Adoption as a Child Welfare Service: CWLA 
2000 Standards, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 45, supra note 2, at 45–46. 
2
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• Adoption as a child welfare service should be focused 
on meeting the needs of the children to be become full 
and permanent members of families. 
 
• All children are adoptable. 
 
• Siblings should be placed together in adoption unless 
serious reasons necessitate their separation. 
 
• Adoption is a life long experience that has a unique 
impact on all the parties involved. 
 
• Adoption should validate and assist children in 
developing their individual, cultural, ethnic, and racial 
identity, and should enhance their self-esteem.  All 
adoption services should be based on principles of 
respect, honesty, self-determination, informed 
decision-making, and open communication. 
 
• All applicants for services should be treated in a fair 
and non discriminatory manner.4 
 
While the above summary of the Child Welfare League of 
America Standards of Excellence in Adoption Services may reflect 
some departure from previous adoption standards, these standards 
nevertheless continue to state the commitment by the social service 
professionals as to what they determine to be in the “child’s best 
interests.”  At the same time, approaching it from a more legalistic 
standpoint, and in an attempt also to provide services deemed to be 
in the “children’s best interests” and supportive of adoptions, the 
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys has established its code 
of ethics as follows: 
The American Academy of Adoption Attorneys hereby 
make and establish this Code of Ethics. 
1. A Member shall be duly licensed to practice law in each 
state in which the Member maintains a law office, shall 
fully comply with the Ethical and [other Rules and 
Canons] of Professional Conduct . . . and shall maintain 
the highest standards of professional and ethical conduct.  
 
 4. Id. 
3
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A Member shall not engage in activities which bring 
discredit upon the Academy. 
2. (a) A Member shall assure that the Member’s clients 
are aware of their legal rights and obligations in the 
adoption, and that all parties to the adoption are aware of 
their right to separate legal counsel. . . . 
3. A Member shall not purport to represent both the 
prospective adopting parent(s) and one or both birth 
parents, where such representation is specifically 
prohibited. . . . 
4. A Member shall actively discourage adoption fraud or 
misrepresentation, and shall not engage in such conduct, 
and shall take all reasonable measures not inconsistent 
with the confidentiality of the attorney/client 
relationship, to prevent adoption fraud or 
misrepresentation, withdrawing from representation 
where necessary to avoid participation in any such 
conduct. 
5. (a) A Member shall assure that clients to an adoption 
are aware of any laws which govern permissible financial 
assistance to a birth parent. 
  (b) A Member shall not assist or cooperate in any 
adoption in which the Member has reason to believe that 
the birth parent or parents are being paid, or given 
anything of value, in exchange for the placement for 
adoption, for the consent to an adoption, for 
relinquishment for adoption, or for cooperation with the 
adoption of his or her child, without first making full 
disclosure to the appropriate court.  This rule does not 
make it improper for a Member to assist or cooperate with 
an adoption in which the birth parent or parents are 
reimbursed for reasonable and necessary pregnancy-
related expenses actually incurred by the birth parent, or 
in which such expenses are paid directly on behalf of the 
birth parent, provided that such payment or 
reimbursement is allowed under the [state] law. . . . 
6. A Member shall assure that the Member’s fee 
arrangement with each client is carefully explained and 
fully understood by the client. . . . 
7. A Member shall not enter into an agreement for, 
charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee . . . 
[and] shall not, directly or indirectly, charge a finder’s fee 
4
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for locating a birth parent. . . . 
8. A Member shall not possess a financial stake in the 
success of any adoption in which the Member is retained 
as counsel for any party.  A financial stake in an adoption 
[occurs] if the Member enters into a fee agreement by 
which the Member is to receive a greater fee for a 
successful adoption than is warranted based upon the 
reasonable value of the services performed by the 
Member; or . . . a lesser fee than the reasonable value of 
the services performed by the Member if the attempted 
adoption is unsuccessful. . . . 
10. A Member shall not make false or misleading claims in 
advertisements, nor shall a Member include client 
testimonials in such advertising. . . . 
11. . . . (b) A Member shall not induce or encourage a 
birth parent to change selection of prospective adopting 
parents unless the Member knows or has reason to believe 
that the proposed adopting parents cannot obtain court 
approval of a placement with them. 
12. A Member shall not enter into any agreement with any 
person which would have the effect of restricting the 
Member’s ability to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of the Member’s clients. 
13. A Member may, when appropriate and/or when 
requested by a client, refer parties to competent and 
professional medical providers, legal counsel, 
psychological counselors, or adoption agencies. . . . 
14. A Member shall be under a duty to investigate 
representations made to the Member by prospective birth 
parents and prospective adopting parents if the Member 
believes or has reason to believe that such representation 
is false.  [E.g., a birth mother’s claims about the 
whereabouts or name of the biological father.]  Under all 
other circumstances, a Member may ethically rely upon 
representations made by the parties to an adoption.5 
 “Adoption is a legal proceeding whereby the parent-child 
relationship is created between the person or married couple 
adopting . . . and the person being adopted . . . .”6  Despite this fact, 
 
 5. American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, supra note 2, at 43–44. 
 6. Golda Zimmerman, What Is Adoption—Overview, in ADOPTION LAW: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 3 (Golda Zimmerman ed., 2004). 
5
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there is an overlap in the relationship between the legal 
proceedings and the commitment to children through the social 
services that cannot be avoided. 
Further, while it is true that “[a]doptions in the United States 
exist strictly according to statute, in derogation of common law,”7 it 
is also true that the interpretation of those statutes is usually done 
within the context of an attempt to do what is in the “children’s 
best interests.” 
Despite the attempts of many to reflect, in statutory and case 
law determinations, the views of society, 
[i]t can be said that the state of the law is often behind 
what is currently happening in society and science, and 
what are common or acceptable patterns of behavior.  
This belief is particularly true when one takes a current 
assessment of the practice and procedures of adoption law 
in the 21st Century.  Issues such as assisted reproduction 
technology, adoption facilitators, adoption mediation, 
and gay and lesbian adoption are not adequately 
addressed by statute, if addressed at all.8 
It is this constant tension between the changing attitudes and 
views of society toward its children and families and the strict 
construction of statutory law that continue to demonstrate that 
“[a]doption is a complicated area of the law and legal errors can 
result in devastating consequences.”9 
In addition to the ongoing tension and conflict between 
statutory interpretation and the slowness of statutes to reflect 
changing societal attitudes, the reality of adoption law exists as the 
result of the numerous differences in the population of adopted 
children available.  In most cases, adoption statutes in all states, 
including Minnesota, are consistent and do not reflect on their face 
a difference in the children to be adopted.  Nevertheless, most 
statutory provisions have resulted from considerations of specific 
children available for adoption.  In general, those populations can 
be divided into two groups.  The first group consists of children 
who are infants or children under the age of two.  Those children 
may be coming from single mothers, intact families, foreign 
countries, or, in some unusual cases, through the Child Welfare 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. AMY M. SILBERBERG, MINNESOTA ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1999). 
6
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System.10  The second group consists of those children who have 
been involuntarily removed from their families of origin by the 
State and, as a result of the need for permanency in their lives after 
removal, are available for adoption.  In most cases, those children 
have been the subject of significant abuse or neglect, have had one 
or more placements in foster care, and are generally older 
children, often involved in sibling groups.11 
Both of these separate categories of children have different 
needs and are viewed differently by society in general and adoption 
statutes in particular. 
This article will focus on historical developments of adoption 
law in Minnesota and, briefly, nationally.12 This article then offers 
analysis of selected areas of adoption law,13 and ends with 
descriptions of expectations for future developments in adoption 
law.14 
II. THE GENERAL HISTORY OF ADOPTION 
Adoption as a concept, and specifically as a legal concept, is in 
many ways a uniquely American creation.  As the Progressive 
Movement of the late nineteenth century merged with changing 
views of children and families, all states eventually created adoption 
statutes, attempting in many ways to create better situations for 
families.15  As the more specific description of the history of 
Minnesota statutes in the next section shows,16 the statutes changed 
over time in their continuing attempt to reflect the ever-shifting 
views of society toward children and families.  But at every point, 
there was an ongoing attempt by those involved in the various 
welfare societies, as well as the state, to do what they thought was in 
“children’s best interests.” 
This often included the movement of children from what were 
viewed as the poverty areas of the large cities on the east coast out 
to the farms and rural areas in the Midwest.  There were, in fact, 
 
 10. See generally MINN. STAT. § 259.47 (2006) (dealing previously with the 
placement of infants). 
 11. See generally Id. § 259.29, subdiv. 2 (dealing previously with the placement 
of older children with relatives of kin). 
 12. See infra Parts II, III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGER AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 
15 (2002). 
 16. See infra Part III. 
7
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requests by various persons in the Midwest for children.  In the 
early 1920s, the following notice appeared in Outlook, a nationally 
circulated magazine directed at social workers and reformers: 
Desirable home is available for boy of seven or eight with 
superior mentality and healthy heredity.  Family consists 
of university graduates, and child would receive skillful 
attention in respect to health and education, including 
music if desirable, also college and professional training 
later.  Neighborhood and general environment the best.17 
In 1918, the Mayor of Bogalusa, Louisiana, wrote the 
Children’s Aid Society of New York to request 
some white babies . . . a car load . . . by a car load, mean 
about thirty to fifty.  We do not care to know anything 
about their antecedents or parentage.  All we want to 
know is that they are healthy.  We would be interested in 
about one half Protestant and one half Catholic children, 
both boys and girls.18 
These two examples reflected a competing view of family and 
child placement characteristics in the early stages of adoption.  
This period reflected a transitional moment in the history of 
adoption.  What has been referred to as “instrumental adoption” 
was a kind of adoption in which older children were far more 
desirable than infants, who were consequently rarely the subject of 
this type of adoption.19  Instrumental adoption was influenced by 
concepts of apprenticeship and was based on a calculus concerning 
the worth of a child’s labor.20 
By the early twentieth century, however, many people began to 
turn to adoption in search of children to cherish, throwing away 
consideration of their economic value.  At that point, “sentimental 
adoption” was developed and was predicated not on economic 
value but on the sense of the child’s emotional value to the parents 
and to the family.21 
The earlier economic view of children as essentially “chattel” is 
clear in the request from Louisiana: 
The Mayor’s letter suggests the persistence of older forms 
of child exchange.  His letter addressed the Children’s 
 
 17. MELOSH, supra note 15, at 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 12–13. 
 20. Id. at 12. 
 21. Id. at 13. 
8
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Aid Society of New York.  Under the leadership of Charles 
Lowery Brace, that organization collected children from 
the city’s streets to transport them to the supposedly more 
salubrious environs of midwestern farms.  Begun in the 
mid-1850s, these orphan trains had fallen into disrepute 
by 1918.  Progressive-era reformers instead turned to 
“home relief,” that is, keeping children within their 
original families and caring for them in their homes.  The 
mayor’s request for a “carload” of “thirty to fifty” children 
was strikingly at odds with emerging new middle-class 
models of childhood: his casual quantification seemed to 
posit children as readily exchangeable surplus 
commodities, an affront to the sentimentality and 
emotion associated with childhood.  Moreover, the 
unsavory whiff of apprenticeship clings to his letter.22 
The observation by the Mayor of a concern for the health of 
the children seems to imply the expectation that they will be put to 
work on the farms, a characteristic of the “instrumental family” that 
was being assaulted by reformers who agitated for child labor laws 
and compulsory schooling.23  Nevertheless, in his request for 
“babies,” there is also an indication of a desire for children too 
young to work, reflecting the beginnings of changes in attitudes 
toward adoption itself.24 
More strongly reflecting the changes in attitudes, 
[t]he Outlook announcement, written just a few years later, 
implies a very different world of child nurture and family.  
In sharp contrast to the Mayor’s order of a job lot of 
healthy children, these petitioners seek one particular 
child, meticulously specified by sex, age, intelligence, and 
inheritance.  If these petitioners are far choosier about 
the child they seek, they are also far more concerned to 
present their own credentials as parents.  Saying nothing 
about religion, they offer as inducements the material and 
cultural advantage of the middle-class life.  The two 
documents reveal radically different assessments of the 
economy of adoption.  The Mayor assumes that the 
Children’s Aid Society has large numbers of children on 
hand, ready to be distributed for the asking.  The Outlook 
notice, in contrast, implies an economy of scarcity.  The 
[prospective] adopters, or whoever is writing on their 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
9
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behalf, have resorted to national advertising to find a 
single child.25 
While the first adoption law was actually passed in 1851 in 
Massachusetts, this and earlier laws were actually directed primarily 
at the regulation of inheritance.26  Even as they did, in fact, create a 
legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the children, 
they specifically made provisions for bequests to those outside the 
circle of blood kinship and also explicitly defended the rights of 
biological heirs.27 
By contrast, the evolving institution of adoption in the 
twentieth century made adoptive families in the United 
States the full legal equivalent of families formed by 
biology.  In some times and places, adoption had 
established a new relationship between adults.  In the 
United States, adoption meant child adoption, and by 
decree of adoption, biological strangers became legal and 
social kin.28 
As noted, 
[a]doption was crafted in the context of Progressive 
reform and modernizing culture, as the religious and 
moral commitments of Victorianism yielded to the new 
understandings of social and behavioral science.  The 
emergence of modern adoption required a radically 
different understanding of family, one that overturned 
deeply held beliefs about blood and nurture, obligation 
and love, choice and chance.  It was no accident that the 
United States was the crucible of this kind of adoption: in 
its repudiation of the past and its confidence in social 
engineering, adoption is quintessentially American.29 
Over the next hundred years, the changing social mores and 
attitudes directly affected, albeit at some times in a delayed 
manner, the attitude toward and support for adoption.  “During 
the 1910s and 1920s, adoption emerged as an ambitious new social 
transaction, a legal and cultural institution that conferred kinship 
on parents and children unrelated by blood.”30  Additionally, “new 
adoptive famil[ies] reflected another change within American 
 
 25. Id. at 13–14. 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
10
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culture: the ongoing transformation of middle-class family life.  For 
nearly a century, Americans had made marriage a more individual 
affair, as young people insisted on choosing their own partners.  
They added romantic love to duty in the marriage contract.”31 
This changing view of families in marriage, along with various 
exposés in the 1890s and early 1900s, spurred reformers to respond 
to a range of social problems—from disabilities to child 
dependency—by building institutions, as opposed to supporting 
adoption or movement within the family.32 
A 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent 
Children gathered together a new breed of child welfare workers: 
“The benevolent reform of charity workers and evangelical 
missions yielded to a new professionalization of reform, one that 
appealed to the expertise of social science.”33  Institutional care was 
viewed now as a last resort.34  A growing faith in nurture over nature 
by child welfare experts looking for new solutions began to have 
significant impact.35  This, along with a new attitude toward women 
who were pregnant out of wedlock, again shifted the commitment 
toward adoption.36  Development of the goal to keep the mother 
and child together often conflicted with the values of providing 
stability and security within a family setting.  This conflict 
developed into observations of an illicit alternative to the 
rehabilitative agenda of keeping mothers and children together.37  
As reflected in a Progressive exposé entitled The Traffic in Babies, a 
1914 report by George Walker, the results of an investigation of two 
Baltimore baby farms were well respected: 
For a fee, they took babies off the hands of mothers 
looking to save themselves from the disgrace of single 
motherhood.  Some also boarded pregnant women until 
their babies’ births, further helping to conceal an illicit 
pregnancy.  The profit in such services depended on a 
grisly calculus: at a time when bottle feeding was not yet a 
reliable substitute for breast milk, most babies did not 
survive separation from their mothers and so did not 
become a financial burden for the proprietors.  Only the 
 
 31. Id. at 16. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 17. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 18. 
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hardiest newborns could survive a regimen that often 
combined bottle feeding with poor sanitation and 
negligent care.  Walker’s investigation reported a death 
rate of over 80 percent of all babies admitted and gave a 
grim account of the mass graves to which their small 
bodies were consigned.38 
There were even attitudes among some that it was “better that 
[they] should die” as opined by one woman as she explained to an 
investigator why she referred mothers of “illegitimate” babies to 
such an institution.39 
As a result of the appalling attitudes and the exposé, views 
toward adoption shifted back and forth.  At the same time, 
attitudes were shifting back and forth regarding marriage, 
unplanned pregnancies, illegitimate children, and adoption.  
“Along with Progressive reform, the developing profession of social 
work helped to displace the moralism of nineteenth-century 
evangelical reformers.”40  While “evangelical reformers had reached 
out to the ‘fallen women’ . . . the retribution for sin was the 
sentence of single motherhood.  A new generation of secular 
reformers was both less concerned with punishing the sinner and 
more concerned about the effects of such redemption on the 
child.”41 
Later social workers would endorse adoption as another 
solution for children born out of wedlock.42  This was a way to give 
the sexual transgressor an additional chance and also to save the 
child from the consequences of the mother’s mistakes.43  Through 
the time of the Second World War, the “fallen women” of the 
nineteenth century had become susceptible to the intervention of 
experts.44  That resulted in a significant increase in, and 
recommendation for, the stability of adoption. 
III.  SELECTED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MINNESOTA STATUTES 
As with national statutory developments, Minnesota statutes 
have been periodically revised to reflect the view of the day.  
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
12
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Historically, common law adoption did not exist45 and was created 
through statute.46  The philosophical views of society are reflected 
in statutory change.47  The rights of birth parents, adoptive parents, 
and children have shifted over time as those attitudes have shifted. 
The earliest statutes in Minnesota dealing with adoption appear 
to have been enacted in 187648 and reveal the views of the time.  Any 
inhabitant of the state could petition “the district court in the county 
of his residence” to adopt a child.49  If the person petitioning was 
married, it was required that the husband or wife join in the adoption 
petition or it would not be granted.50  An adoption would not be 
granted without the consent of the birth parents, if they were living.51  
But if no parent was living, then the next of kin could consent to the 
adoption—if no next of kin was available, then the chairman of the 
board of the county commissioners could give consent.52  And if the 
child was “not born in lawful wedlock,” the consent only had to be 
given by the mother.53  “But the court could find that the child had 
been “abandoned” (although this was not defined) and obtain 
consent from a guardian or the chairman of the county board so that 
the adoption could proceed.54 
A child of age fourteen or over had to consent to his own 
adoption.55  If there were not any parents or kin around, the court 
was required to publish the notice of the hearing in a “paper of 
general circulation,”56 published in the county where the petition was 
presented, for at least three successive weeks.57  If the court found 
that the petitioners were of suitable nature and ability to provide for, 
 
 45. See In re Jaren’s Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947); WRIGHT 
S. WALLING, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION 
ON ADOPTION, LEGAL COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATION A VIEW FROM THE PAST 1 
(1993). 
 46. See Joseph W. Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 
MINN. L. REV 605 (1927). 
 47. WALLING, supra note 45, at 1. 
 48. MINN. STAT. ch. 124, §§ 26–32 (1878).  These sections were incorporated 
from an 1876 act, “An act providing for the adoption of children,” approved February 
26, 1876.  1876 Minn. Laws 107.  
 49. MINN. STAT. ch. 124, § 26 (1878). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 27. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 28. 
 56. Id. § 29. 
 57. Id. 
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nurture, and educate the child, then a decree of adoption was issued, 
ordering that the “child shall be deemed and taken to be the child of 
the petitioner or petitioners . . . .”58 
After the adoption, the adopted child was to be deemed, as to 
“all legal consequences and incidents,” the natural relation of 
adoptive parents as if he had “been born to them in lawful wedlock.”59  
The exception to this was that, for purposes of inheritance, the 
adoption itself would not “constitute such child the heir of such 
parents or parents by adoption.”60  Thus, despite adoption, the child 
would not automatically inherit from his adoptive parents.  But the 
natural parents were deprived “of all legal rights respecting the child” 
and the child was “free from all obligations of maintenance and 
obedience respecting his natural parents.”61 
In 1894, changes and additions began to occur.62  The court was 
allowed to proceed with an adoption if “either parent” was, by reason 
of having been declared insane, incapacitated from giving a 
consent.63  The statutes now indicated that if a parent had lost the 
care and custody of the child by judgment in a divorce, then the 
consent of that non-custodial parent was not required in order to 
proceed with an adoption.64  The courts were given specific authority, 
if requested by the person adopting a child, to decree that the child 
adopted would be the heir of the person and, in that case, that the 
adopted child would inherit directly from the adopted parent “in all 
respects as if born to said parent in lawful wedlock.”65  But the statutes 
also said that “no person shall, by being adopted, lose his right to 
inherit from his natural parents or kindred.”66 
Additional concepts were added in 1905.67  There was an 
 
 58. Id. § 30. 
 59. Id. § 31. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 32. 
 62. WALLING, supra note 45, at 3.  See also Recent Cases, Adoption-Adopted Child-
Remainders-Trust Deeds, 2 MINN. L. REV. 300 (1918); Recent Cases, Adoption-Rights of 
Inheritance-Second Adoption, 2 MINN. L. REV. 301 (1918); Recent Cases, Adoption-
Death of Adopted Child-Right of Natural and Adoptive Parents to Inherit, 6 MINN. L. REV. 
65 (1921); Recent Cases, Adoption-Inheritance from Adopted Children-Rights of Heirs 
and Next of Kin of the Adopted Parents to Inherit, 18 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1934); Recent 
Cases, Adoption-Descent and Distribution-Effect of Second Adoption on Child’s Right to 
Inherit from First Adoptive Parents, 26 MINN. L. REV. 114 (1942). 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 8017 (1894). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 8021. 
 66. Id. § 8023. 
 67. WALLING, supra note 45, at 3–4. 
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indication that an adult could be adopted, where the statute said, “a 
person of full age may be adopted.”68  The status of a child for 
inheritance purposes was further clarified, with the statute indicating 
that “upon adoption such child shall become the legal child of the 
person adopting him, and they shall become his legal parents, with all 
the rights and duties between them of natural parents and legitimate 
child.”69  The adopted child would inherit from his adopting parents 
and all of the appropriate relatives.70 
Another section required that anyone bringing a child into the 
state for purposes of adoption had to “first obtain the consent of the 
state board of control, whose duty it shall be to carry out the 
provisions of this section, and such person shall conform to the rules 
of the board.”71  It further required the filing of a bond whose 
purpose was to guarantee that the person was not bringing in a child 
who was incorrigible or unsound of mind or body, and that the 
person agreed to remove the child from the state if the child became 
a public charge.72  The statute required anyone bringing a child into 
the state for purposes of adoption to enter into a “written contract” 
with the person adopting the child, agreeing that the adoptive parent 
would be responsible for the proper care and training of the child.73  
It also charged the person importing the child with the care and 
supervision of the child and with visiting the child at least once a 
year.74  It was a criminal violation to not follow through with these 
requirements.75 
Under certain circumstances, a hospital was allowed to consent 
to an adoption when an illegitimate child was born in that hospital.76  
Another section of the statute allowed the court to commit to an 
orphan asylum any child under the age of sixteen who was “engaged 
in a ‘mendicant occupation’ or as a gymnast, contortionist, rider, or 
 
 68. MINN. STAT. § 3612 (1905). 
 69. Id. § 3616. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 3617. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. § 3617. 
 75. Id.  See also Recent Cases, Adoption-Specific Performance of and Contract to 
Adopt, 16 MINN. L. REV. 578, 578 (1931) (citing Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, 178 
N.E. 118 (Ill. 1931)); Recent Cases, Parent and Child-Specific Performance of Pre-
Adoptive Contact in Derogation of Adoptive Parents’ Rights, 15 MINN. L. REV. 700, 719 
(1930). 
 76. MINN. STAT. § 3619 (1905). 
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acrobat, or in any indecent or immoral exhibition or vocation . . . .”77 
Following the shifts of societal attitudes, the 1917 statutes reflect 
additional changes and expansion of the statutory statements 
regarding adoption.78  There was a clear indication that upon the 
filing of a petition for adoption, the court was required to notify the 
State Board of Control.79  The State Board of Control was then 
required to verify all of the allegations in the petition and “to 
investigate the condition and antecedents of the child for purposes of 
ascertaining whether he [was] a proper subject for adoption; and to 
make appropriate inquiry to determine whether the proposed foster 
home [was] a suitable home for the child.”80  (This was an early 
“Home Study.”)  Also for the first time, there was an indication that a 
petition would not be granted until the child had lived in the home 
for a minimum of six months.81 
For the first time, the law clearly gave the court the ability to 
waive any investigation and waive any period of residency “upon good 
cause shown” and when it was satisfied that the proposed home and 
child were suited to one another.82  (Notice, at least in the statutes, 
that Minnesota was still not using the term “best interests of the 
child.”)  In addition to not requiring the consent of anyone who lost 
custody in a divorce proceeding, the statutes also stated that no 
consent needed be obtained from anyone who had lost custody 
through “the order of a juvenile court.”83  But the notice provision 
now required (even though a consent was not required) that notice 
be given to all “known kindred of the child,” and also to “a parent 
who [had] lost custody of a child through divorce proceedings, and 
the father of an illegitimate child who [had] acknowledged his 
paternity in writing or against whom paternity has been duly 
adjudged . . . .”84  The manner of service was as directed by the 
court.85 
For the first time, adoptive parents had the ability to “annul” a 
previous adoption.86  If the child, within five years of his adoption, 
 
 77. Id. § 3618. 
 78. See MINN. STAT. §§ 7151–61 (1917)); see also WALLING, supra note 45, at 5. 
 79. MINN. STAT. § 7152 (1917). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 7153. 
 84. Id. § 7155. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. § 7158. 
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developed feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, insanity, or venereal 
infection, as a result of conditions existing before the adoption, and 
of which the adopting parents had no knowledge or notice, then the 
adoption could be annulled.87  Also for the first time, the county 
attorney was required to represent the interests of the child.88  The 
first mention of having closed files is now seen.  In this statute, the 
files and records of the court in these proceedings would “not be 
open to inspection or copy by other persons than the parties in 
interest and their attorneys . . . except upon order of the court 
expressly permitting the same.”89 
In 1941, a revised, reorganized volume of Minnesota Statutes was 
created, compiling previous versions of the statutes and incorporating 
a new decimal classification system.90  Chapter 259 under the revision 
is, to this day, the chapter containing the provisions of the adoption 
code.91  In 1951, major changes were enacted in the adoption 
statutes.92  For the first time, definitions were included in the statutes, 
including definitions of child, parent, petitioner, agency, and 
contents of the petition.93  The statutes began using the words “best 
interests of the child,” and, in particular, used that phrase with 
respect to the authority of the court to do certain things.94  What we 
would consider more modern language began to appear. 
There was an added requirement that consent of parents of a 
minor mother of an illegitimate child be obtained,95 and that an adult 
being adopted also had to consent to the adoption.96  There was an 
indication that after a petition had been filed and a consent had been 
signed, the consent to the adoption could be withdrawn only upon 
order of the court after written findings that such withdrawal was in 
“the best interests of the child.”97 
More specificity was given to the written agreement to be 
entered into between an agency and the biological parents regarding 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 7159. 
 90. JOHN TESSNER ET AL., MINNESOTA LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 309 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 91. Compare MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (1941), with MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (2006).  See 
also WALLING, supra note 45, at 6. 
 92. See 1951 Minn. Laws 769–75 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 259.21–.32 (1953)). 
 93. MINN. STAT. § 259.21 (1953). 
 94. See, e.g., id. § 259.24, subdiv. 6. 
 95. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 1. 
 96. Id. § 259.24, subdiv. 4.  
 97. Id. § 259.24, subdiv. 6. 
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placement of the child.  This agreement was now specifically to be 
executed by the director or agency, or by one of their authorized 
agents, and all other necessary parties, and it had to be filed together 
with the consent.98  This agreement also could not be revoked except 
upon order of the court, based on the best interests of the child.99 
There was an indication that a notice of the hearing could be 
waived by the person entitled to notice if that waiver was executed 
before two competent witnesses and duly acknowledged.100  That 
waiver had to be filed with the court.101  Also for the first time, all 
“hearings” in adoption proceedings had to be confidential and held 
in closed court with only certain people authorized to be present.102 
It was clearly directed that any order, judgment, or decree of the 
court pursuant to the adoption provisions could be appealed.103  Any 
person against whom the order was made or who was affected by it 
could appeal.104  Appeals were to be done in the same manner as 
other civil appeals.105 
In response to the 1972 United States Supreme Court decision 
in Stanley v. Illinois,106 the Minnesota Legislature passed a statute 
regarding retention of the rights of the illegitimate father,107 
colloquially known as the “60/90-day statute.”  This statute 
recognized that an unmarried man who fathered an illegitimate child 
could have an interest in the child and some legal rights that had to 
be protected.108  The statute also placed the burden upon the man to 
express his desire to establish a relationship by filing an affidavit 
within sixty days of the child’s placement for adoption or ninety days 
after the child’s birth.109  The automatic effect of the filing of the 
affidavit was not to make the man the “legal father” or to be the 
equivalent of a finding of paternity—rather, it resulted only in notice 
 
 98. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 1. 
 99. Id. § 259.25, subdiv. 2. 
 100. Id. § 259.26, subdiv. 1 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.49 (2006)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 259.31 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.61 (2006)). 
 103. Id. § 259.32 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.63 (2006)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 107. 1974 Minn. Laws 89–90 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974) 
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006))). 
 108. See MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52 
(2006)). 
 109. Id. 
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to the other parent within seven days.110 
If, after notice to the other parent, there was no response within 
sixty days, then the affidavit would constitute “conclusive evidence of 
parenthood” for the purpose of the adoption statute.111  In order to 
challenge this affidavit, the birth mother or some other interested 
person could deny that the man was the parent of the child and file a 
petition (unspecified in nature) to challenge the notice of 
parenthood.112 
In 1980, the statute was amended to allow for withdrawal of 
consent within ten working days after the consent was executed and 
acknowledged.113  Notification of withdrawal of consent had to be 
received by the agency to which the child had been surrendered no 
later than the tenth working day after the consent was executed or 
acknowledged.114  After that, it became irrevocable except upon a 
finding of fraud.115 
While other changes occurred—changes particularly procedural 
in nature—the most significant addition to the statutes after 1980 and 
before the 1994 major revision of the statute was the Minority Child 
Heritage Protection Act enacted in 1983.116  This law stated that 
“[t]he policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best 
interests of the child are met by requiring due consideration of the 
child’s minority race or minority ethnic heritage in adoption 
placements.”117  International adoptions were excluded from the 
requirements of this provision if “the appropriate authority in the 
child’s country of birth [had] approved the placement.”118  It was 
therefore originally known as the Minnesota Minority Child 
Heritage Protection Act.119  Reference to minority heritage was 
removed during the pendency of the litigation known as In re D.L.120 
 
 110. Id. § 259.261, subdiv. 3. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 1980 Minn. Laws 778 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.24, subdiv. 6a 
(1980)). 
 114. MINN. STAT. § 259.24, subdiv. 6a (1980). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 1983 Minn. Laws 1192–99 (codified at scattered sections of MINN. STAT. 
chs. 257, 259, 260 (1984)). 
 117. MINN. STAT. § 259.255 (1984). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A 
Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REV. 925, 930–31 
(1993). 
 120. 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992); Glynn, supra note 119, at 930 n.20. 
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The act set preferences, in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, with respect to the placement of children in adoption.121  
Those preferences were, in order: a relative or relatives of the child, a 
family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or a family 
of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child that was 
knowledgeable and appreciative of the child’s racial or ethnic 
heritage.122  The child’s genetic parent or parents were allowed to 
request that the preferences not be followed.123  The child’s genetic 
parent or parents were also allowed to express a preference for 
placing the child in an adoptive home of the same or similar religious 
background to that of the genetic parents in following the 
preferences listed above.124  Interpretation of this statute and, in 
particular, the enforcement of this statute in non-infant adoptions 
has caused a great deal of litigation.125  The statutes have been 
repealed in light of the Federal Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, which 
prohibited placement based on race.126 
IV.  CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
Virtually all of the changes in the last twenty years to adoption 
statutes have been the result of the new attitude supporting the 
concept of “open adoption.”  In that context, “[a]doption is 
increasingly understood to be a dynamic, lifelong process that 
entails the acknowledgment by both adoptive and birth families of 
each other’s existence and role in the lives of adopted children.”127  
“‘Openness’ has become the mantra of contemporary adoption 
policy and practice.”128  This concept has pervaded virtually all 
issues in the adoption field, including the rights of birth mothers, 
the rights of birth fathers, the role of adoptive parents, the rights of 
children, and the underlying definition of adoption itself.  It is also 
the fuel driving new and continuing discussions of further changes 
in adoption attitudes and statutes. 
 
 121. See 1983 Minn. Laws 1197 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 260.181, subdiv. 3 
(1984)); MINN. STAT. § 259.29 (1984). 
 122. 1983 Minn. Laws 1197. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., In re S.T. and N.T., 512 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1994); In re D.L., 486 
N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992); In re T.L.A., 677 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 126. Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4057 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994)). 
 127. FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 157. 
 128. Id. 
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Further, “[o]pen adoption may be limited to the exchange of 
information between the families at the time of placement and the 
sending of an occasional photo or letter, but may in some cases be 
much broader, including regular visitation by members of the birth 
family with the adopted child long after the adoption is final.”129 
In this same context, there has been an evolution in the 
consideration of enforceability or the recording of “openness” 
agreements.  They can be informal, formal, supported by written 
documents or, as in Minnesota, supported by available court 
orders.130  This dramatic shift in both power and attitude, resulting 
from the concept of “open adoption,” has, in many people’s view, 
resulted in a complete revolution of how we define and create 
families. 
A. The Changing Rights, Responsibilities, and Power of Birth Mothers 
Although often overlooked, perhaps one of the most dramatic 
shifts that has occurred in the last twenty years has been the way in 
which children are “placed” for adoption.  As reflected further on, 
the 1994 Minnesota Legislature recognized this change with a 
dramatic and comprehensive revision of all adoption statutes.131  
While there are many issues of significance, perhaps the most 
dramatic change was the specific ability of birth parents to place 
their children for adoption with adoptive parents they had selected, 
rather than requiring that “child placing agencies” place children 
with adoptive parents the agencies had selected.  This was the first 
significant reflection of the critical movement toward “open 
adoptions” in Minnesota law.132 
While there are many reasons for this shift, 
[a]mong the factors contributing to the prevalence of 
open domestic adoptions is the rarely noted shift in power 
from adoptive to birth parents.  As the competition 
among would-be adoptive parents has intensified because 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (2006). 
 131. See 1994 Minn. Laws 1877–92 (codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 259 (1994)). 
 132. See MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1994).  Before that time, all adoption records 
and identifying information were confidential and only able to be released with a 
court order.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 259.46, .31 (1992).  Since this confidentiality 
extended to birth parents as well, and since before 1994 only licensed child 
placing agencies, and not birth parents, could place children for adoption, there 
was no possibility of any openness without a perceived violation of statute.  See 
MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1992). 
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of the steep decline since the late 1960s in the number of 
healthy infants who are voluntarily relinquished for 
adoption, a more distinctive “seller’s market” has 
emerged.  Birth parents, and especially birth mothers, are 
not only choosing the individuals who will parent their 
children, but often expect to retain a role in the life of the 
new adoptive family.  [Prospective parents] who harbor 
doubts about meeting, or maintaining contact with birth 
parents, may be less likely to end up with a child to 
adopt.133 
Before the recognition in the statutes of the shift in the social 
attitudes, no one could petition for adoption of a specific child 
“unless the child sought to be adopted ha[d] been placed by the 
Commissioner of Human Services, the Commissioner’s agent, or a 
licensed child placing agency.”134  This left birth parents in a 
position in which the decision as to who would adopt their child 
would be made by a group of social workers based on their own 
prejudices, backgrounds, and histories.  At times, those decisions 
were made based on race, religion, income, intellect, or financial 
ability.135  In any case, some mothers described those situations as 
placing their child into the “black hole” of adoption agencies with 
no information available about them, the child, and no input into 
who did the adoption.136 
Notwithstanding that, since at least 1951, the statutes had 
specifically allowed the court to “waive the requirement” of a 
child’s being placed by a licensed child-placing agency or the 
Commissioner of Human Services.137  During the 1980s and early 
1990s, the practice became to request such a waiver from the court 
when a suitable adoptive family was found, particularly when the 
birth mother desired a particular family to adopt her child.  In 
recognition of the reality of the changing social situation and 
attitude toward families, in 1994 the Minnesota Legislature made 
several significant changes.138  Those changes included the creation 
of a process known as “Direct Adoptive Placement,” allowing a 
 
 133. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact 
Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 159. 
 134. MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 2 (1994). 
 135. Brian Paul Gill, Adoption Agencies and the Search for the Ideal Family, 1918–
1965, in Adoptions in America: Historical Perspectives, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION 
READER, supra note 2, at 67. 
 136. Statements by birth mother clients to Wright S. Walling, Esq. 
 137. MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 1 (1994). 
 138. See  source cited supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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birth mother to select adoptive parents and get pre-birth approval 
of the placement of that child regardless of a lack of involvement 
by a licensed child placing agency or the Commissioner of Human 
Services.139 
Initially, in attempting to clarify the nature of “placement 
activities,” the Legislature defined them as follows: 
(1) placement; 
(2) arranging or providing short-term foster care pending 
an adoptive placement; 
(3) facilitating placement by maintaining a list in any 
form of birth parents or prospective adoptive parents; 
(4) collecting health and social histories of a birth family; 
(5) conducting an adoption study; 
(6) witnessing consents to an adoption; or 
(7) engaging in any activity listed in clauses (1) to (6) for 
the purposes of fulfilling any requirements of the 
interstate compact on the placement of children.140 
The Legislature then set out to define the process known as 
“Direct Adoptive Placement”141 and indicated that it meant “the 
placement of a child by a birth parent or legal guardian other than 
an agency under the procedures for adoption authorized by 
[Section] 259.47.”142 
Continuing in that direction, the Legislature authorized the 
filing of an adoption petition if the child had not been placed in 
conformity with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes Section 
259.47.143  It then went on to lay out a manner by which the court 
could review and verify the appropriate issues in allowing a direct 
placement by a birth parent.144  More specifically, in reflecting its 
desire with respect to allowing direct placement by birth parents, 
the Legislature stated, “the intent of the provisions governing 
direct adoptive placement is to safeguard the best interest of the 
child by providing services and protections to the child, birth 
parents, and adoptive parents which are consistent to those 
 
 139. MINN. STAT. § 259.21, subdiv. 10 (1994). 
 140. Id. § 259.21, subdiv. 9. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 143. MINN. STAT. § 259.22, subdiv. 2(f) (1994). 
 144. See id. § 259.47. 
23
Walling: Adoption Law in Minnesota: A Historical Perspective
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. WALLING - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  12:59:04 PM 
894 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
available through an agency placement.”145 
The Legislature went on to provide the procedure whereby the 
adoptive parents—in conjunction with, and upon agreement of, 
the birth mother—could request a court order allowing and 
approving the placement of the child with the prospective adoptive 
parents.146  It allowed the court order to be requested up to sixty 
days before the anticipated birth of the child.147  It also laid out a 
specific procedure of required affidavits and information from the 
birth mother and adoptive parents.148 
This emphasis on the rights and authority of the birth mother 
are also reflected in other statutory provisions.  For example, the 
birth parent is entitled to receive up to thirty-five hours of adoption 
counseling, provided at the expense of the adoptive parent or 
parents.149  Additionally, the birth parent is entitled to legal counsel 
during the direct placement process, and the adoptive parents are 
required to pay for such representation.150 
Further, the order “shall state that the prospective adoptive 
parent’s right to custody of the child is subject to the birth parent’s 
right to custody until the consents to the child’s adoption become 
irrevocable.”151  Other parts of the statute require a consent form to 
be signed no sooner than seventy-two hours after the birth of the 
subject child.152 Even after signed consent is given, the birth mother 
has an uncontrolled and free ability to withdraw that consent for 
any reason for a period of ten working days after signed consent is 
properly obtained,153 illustrating that the birth mother’s rights 
 
 145. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 1.  It should be noted that birth mothers and fathers 
received disparate treatment, in terms of both biology and the applicable statute.  
Section 257.541, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes states that “the biological 
mother of a child born to a mother who is not married to the child’s father 
neither when the child was born nor when the child was conceived has sole 
custody of the child until paternity has been established under sections 257.51 to 
257.74, or until custody is determined in a separate proceeding under section 
518.156.”  On the other hand, subdivisions 2 and 3 make it clear that at the time of 
birth, the birth father has no automatic legal rights to custody and must 
affirmatively establish both paternity and his right to visitation and custody.  MINN. 
STAT. § 257.541, subdivs. 2–3 (1994). 
 146. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 3. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 4.  The statute imposes an affirmative obligation on 
the adoptive parent to inform the birth mother of her right to counseling.  Id. 
 150. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 5. 
 151. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 3. 
 152. Id. § 259.47, subdiv. 7. 
 153. Id.  
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continue to be recognized and protected beyond the scope of past 
statutes and laws. 
Accordingly, the concept of “open adoption” resulted in a shift 
of power from adoption agencies and adoptive parents to birth 
mothers, giving them complete control of the early stages of 
adoption.  In recognizing the importance of birth parents in the 
decision-making process regarding who would actually “parent” the 
child, the Legislature reflected not only the views of society, but the 
reality that a child is made up as a sum of all of his or her parts, and 
not just those who provide the nurture. 
B. Rights of Putative Fathers—An Evolution 
In Stanley v Illinois,154 the United States Supreme Court 
recognized, for the first time, the constitutional rights of putative 
fathers.  This decision offered putative fathers the opportunity to 
be involved in the lives of their children.155 
In response to the Stanley decision, the Minnesota Legislature 
passed a statute156 regarding retention of rights of fathers known as 
the “60/90-day statute.”157  This statute purported to describe the 
criteria and process under which putative fathers could protect 
their rights.  The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, in 
the case of In re Paternity of J.A.V.,158 failure by the putative father to 
follow the requirement of that statute did not prohibit him from 
bringing a paternity action, as long as the adoption was not 
completed.  The fact that a child had been placed with his or her 
adoptive parents would not function as a bar to a paternity action. 
As a result of this and other decisions, in its report of January of 
1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task 
Force159 recommended that Minnesota adopt a Putative Fathers’ 
Registry statute similar to that which was in existence in Illinois and 
 
 154. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 155. Id. 
 156. 1974 Minn. Laws 89–90 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1974) 
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006))). 
 157. See  discussion supra Part III and accompanying text. 
 158. 547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996). 
 159. See SYKORA & SKOGLUND, HOUSE RESEARCH BILL SUMMARY (Mar. 10, 1997), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/bs/97-98bs/0919a.pdf (summarizing the 
task force proposals); Mary Jo Brooks Hunter, Special Report: Minnesota Supreme 
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (1997) 
(providing the complete task force report). 
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other states.160 
As with all issues relating to adoption, this and other statutes 
have attempted to balance the appropriate rights of putative fathers, 
adoptive parents, birth mothers, and children, within the context of 
looking toward what ultimately would be deemed by society to be in 
the child’s “best interests.”161  More specifically, the Legislature stated 
that there should be established a Fathers’ Adoption Registry for 
“determining the identity and location of a putative father interested 
in a minor child who is, or expected to be, the subject of an adoption 
proceeding, in order to provide notice of the adoption proceeding to 
the putative father who is not otherwise entitled to notice . . . .”162 
In an attempt to balance all of the rights and interests of 
putative fathers, adoptive parents, birth mothers, and children, the 
legislators created a registry whereby any man interested in a 
particular child, or the possibility of a child of his being adopted, 
could register with the State of Minnesota on the Registry, thus 
preventing any adoption from being done without notice to him.163  
Of critical importance was the ability of the putative father, who 
had been with a woman and believed that pregnancy might have 
resulted, to register at any time before the birth of the child.164  
More specifically, the statute states that “a putative father may 
register with the Department of Health before the birth of a child 
but may register no later than 30 days after the birth of the 
child.”165 
In a continuing attempt to balance the rights, responsibilities 
and “best interests,” the statute indicates that the failure to register, 
if the father is not otherwise covered and entitled to notice under 
other statutes, puts the birth father in a position of being “barred 
thereafter from bringing or maintaining an action to assert any 
interest in the child during the pending adoption proceedings 
concerning the child.”166  Further, the father is “considered to have 
abandoned the child”167 and is “considered to have waived and 
 
 160. See MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006) (creating the putative fathers’ adoption 
registry).  See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12/1 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-
202 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.062 (West 2005). 
 161. See Brooks Hunter, supra note 159, at 9. 
 162. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 1(a) (2006). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 7. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(1). 
 167. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(3). 
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surrendered any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial 
proceeding for adoption of the child, and consent of that person to 
the adoption of the child is not required.”168 
More specifically, and as noted by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force, the Minnesota 
Registry is based on Illinois law and, to some extent, Indiana law.169  
 
 168. Id. § 259.52, subdiv. 8(2). 
 169. The Final Report of the January 1997 Minnesota Supreme Court Foster 
Care and Adoption Task Force, on pages 73–74, in response to Hisgun v. Velasco, 
547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996), recommended that Minnesota adopt a registry 
statute similar to that which was in existence in Illinois.  Minnesota Statutes section 
259.52 was the result of this recommendation.  See MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2006).  
Other states have upheld these registries as an appropriate balancing of the rights 
of putative fathers, adoptive parents, mothers, and children, even where the 
mother intentionally hid the child’s existence or did not inform the putative 
father of the pregnancy. 
  The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a refusal to set aside a judgment in 
favor of adoptive parents where the mother had not told the putative father of the 
child.  In re Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  The Indiana Court of 
Appeals concluded that “promptness is measured in terms of the baby’s life not by 
the onset of father’s awareness,” and if a putative father fails to timely register, 
then the State’s obligation to provide an adopted child with a permanent and 
loving family is paramount.  Id. at 287. 
  Illinois upheld its Putative Father’s Registry, which is virtually identical to 
the Minnesota Registry.  See In re K.J.R. & D.F.R., 687 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1 (2006).  In K.J.R., the mother told 
the putative father he was not the father, and another man was named on the 
birth certificate and consented to the adoption.  K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d at 116.  The 
putative father argued that his failure to timely register should be excused due to 
the mother’s misrepresentations.  Id. at 116–18.  The Illinois Court of Appeals 
held that if a putative father has not acted within the 30 days after birth as 
required, the child’s right to a stable environment and finality becomes 
paramount, and the putative father loses all rights to intervene in or vacate 
adoption proceedings.  See id. at 117. 
  The court reasoned that even the mother’s affirmative misrepresentation 
does not excuse a failure to timely register.  Id. at 118.  Since a putative father has 
independent knowledge of the facts giving rise to his duty to register—that he had 
intercourse with the mother—the possibility of parentage “is sufficient to invoke 
the registration provisions” of the registry.  Id.  Where a putative father had 
“substantial reason to suspect” he could be a father, this gave rise to the duty to 
register.  Id. at 119.  A “lack of knowledge of pregnancy or birth is not an 
acceptable reason for failure to register.”  Id. at 117 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 50/12.1(g) (West 1994).  Therefore, the statute required a “positive effort” 
by the putative father to pursue his rights “notwithstanding the silence, passivity, or 
miscommunication” of the mother.  Id. at 119 (emphasis added).  But the court’s 
reference to In re John Doe & Jane Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), is misplaced. Id. 
at 117–18.  In John Doe, the biological mother and father planned together 
throughout the pregnancy, and the father provided for the mother’s expenses.  Id. 
at 182.  The father left the country briefly and the mother placed the child for 
adoption, then told the father the child was stillborn.  Id.  Upon learning, fifty-
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In balancing the equities, and in conformity with other cases 
around the country, the statute provides a process for a putative 
father to show timely registration despite having registered later 
than thirty days after the birth of the child.170  In such a case, the 
putative father can show timely registration by proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that: “(i) it was not possible for him to 
register within the period of time specified . . . ; (ii) his failure to 
register was through no fault of his own; and (iii) he registered 
within ten days after it became possible for him to file.”171 
Thus, the responsibility for protecting the putative father’s 
constitutional right to notice has shifted and is clearly placed 
directly on his shoulders.  The new statute also eliminated the 
problem raised in Hisgun v. Velasco172 in that it not only prohibits an 
untimely-registering putative father from exercising a claim for the 
child in the adoption proceeding, but also prohibits him from 
bringing any action to assert an interest in the child, including a 
paternity action.173 
While giving the putative father essentially ten months to 
register and exert his rights, the Minnesota courts have been 
consistent in strictly interpreting the statutes.  For example, the 
thirty-day requirement has been strictly enforced against men who 
are living out of state and do not know the location of the mother 
or the date of birth of the child.174 
Additionally, the courts have strictly interpreted the statute to 
refuse to impose on the birth mother a duty to give notice to any 
 
seven days after the birth, that the child was alive and being adopted, the father 
then began proceedings to contest that adoption.  Id.  Illinois law provided that a 
parent was “unfit,” and therefore consent to adoption was not required, if the 
parent had not shown a “reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 
30 days” of the child’s life.  Id. (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 
1992)).  The Illinois Supreme Court held that a finding that the father failed to 
show a reasonable degree of interest was not supported by the evidence, because 
he had made attempts which were “either frustrated or blocked,” and that 
therefore he had “had no opportunity to discharge any familial duty.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
  The Minnesota Legislature, in enacting the Minnesota Father’s Adoption 
Registry, has balanced the rights of fathers, adoptive parents, children, and birth 
mothers, and provided a clear limit on a putative father’s ability to assert an 
interest in a child and disrupt a child’s placement after a certain time. 
 170. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 8 (2006). 
 171. Id. 
 172. 547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996). 
 173. MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subdiv. 8. 
 174. See Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 366–67 (Minn. 2002). 
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man who has not registered under the registry within the required 
thirty days after the birth time period.175 
Thus, again the “open adoption” concept has directly 
impacted the rights of putative fathers.  Further, with respect to all 
of the participants, the balancing of equities in adoption statutes, as 
in other contexts, has tipped toward security, stability, and 
permanency for adopted children within a relatively short period of 
time.  This significant difference  between birth parents results 
from the fact that, at the time of birth, a birth mother, unmarried 
at the time of birth or the time of conception, is the sole legal 
parent and physical custodian of the child.176 On the other hand, a 
biological father, unmarried to the biological mother at the time of 
conception or the time of birth, has no legal or custodial rights to 
the child without taking some initial action.177  This has been 
reflected in the application of the Fathers’ Adoption Registry to 
putative fathers in the adoption context. 
C. Open Adoption—The Logical Extension 
It is clear that the nature and manner in which adoptions have 
occurred, the issues of placement, and the rights of birth mothers 
and birth fathers have been dramatically affected by the concept of 
“open adoption.”  The prime focus of that concept has, in fact, 
been on what open adoption means, how it is implemented, and 
how it has actually shifted post-adoption contact.  In looking at the 
question of “open adoption” more specifically, in most situations, 
[a]n open adoption is one in which the birth parent(s) at 
least meet the adoptive parents and may even participate 
in selecting them . . . . [O]pen adoption includes the 
exchange of identifying information and the making of 
agreements regarding future contact and communication.  
The frequency and extent of this contact and 
communication will vary and may need to be renegotiated 
at different times in the lives of the individuals involved, 
depending upon their needs and desires and the quality 
of the relationship that evolves . . . .178 
Throughout this revolution of the last twenty-five years, many 
 
 175. Id. at 368. 
 176. See MINN. STAT. § 257.541, subdiv. 1 (2006). 
 177. Id. § 257.541, subdivs. 2–3. 
 178. ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in 
FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 164–65. 
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discussions have occurred about the impact of adoption on all of 
the participants—birth parents, adoptive parents, and child 
(commonly called the adoption triad).  In particular, during the 
1970s and 1980s, a number of popular misconceptions about that 
impact were challenged.179  Among those were perceptions that 
“[c]ouples will not adopt children unless they are guaranteed 
anonymity and secrecy,”180 that “[b]irthmothers want and need 
anonymity to move forward in their lives and put the experience of 
pregnancy and relinquishment behind them,”181 and that 
“[a]doptees will be confused by contact with their birthparents and 
may become emotionally disturbed as a result of being aware of 
and dealing with two mothers during their developmental years.”182  
And, while long-term studies of “open adoptions” have not been 
completed or conclusive, it appears fairly clear that none of those 
fears or misconceptions has proved either to be a barrier to 
adoption or to result in a significant detriment to any of the 
persons involved.  In fact, just the opposite has turned out to be 
true. 
Within this context, several important benefits to open 
adoption have been observed: 
First, the birth parents assume more responsibility for the 
decision to relinquish, and as full participants in the 
placement and entrusting of the child to a known family, 
they are better able to cope with feelings of loss, 
mourning, and grief.  If contact with their birthchild is 
permitted, they are able to further ameliorate these 
findings. 
Next, adoptees’ feelings of rejection by the birthparents 
also can be greatly diminished.  A realistic understanding 
of the problems that led to the adoptive placement 
permits acceptance of the situation.  The continuing link 
with the birthparent dispels the notion that the children 
were abandoned and forgotten.  In open adoption the 
need for search and reunion is eliminated.  Important 
background information—including genetic and medical 
histories—is readily available. 
Finally, for adoptive parents, knowing the birthparents of 
 
 179. Id. at 165. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 166. 
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their children can prevent the fears and fantasies that 
might otherwise have a negative effect on the 
relationships with their adopted children.  Knowing the 
birthparents will enable adoptive parents to provide their 
children with the background information based on first-
hand knowledge and direct contacts.183 
The years of experience have led most people to believe that 
“open adoption” is the best approach because “[i]t minimizes 
emotional and psychological harm and it allows all parties to meet 
their continuing responsibilities to each other.”184 
In consideration of these attitudes, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force in its final report of 
January 1997, after studying the issue of open adoption, made 
recommendations regarding creation of “Open Adoption 
Agreements.”185  Recognizing that the agreements at that point 
were not enforceable, the Task Force recommended making 
“Open Adoption Agreements” enforceable under certain 
conditions.  Reflecting its belief that there were several major 
beneficial effects, the Task Force wrote: 
First, making open adoption agreements enforceable may 
encourage parents to voluntarily terminate their parental 
rights earlier, knowing they will have some contact 
(however, minimal) with their child.  This will result in 
quicker permanency for children.  Second, making open 
adoption agreements enforceable will help to protect 
relationships with birth parents and birth relatives when it 
is in the best interests of the child to do so.186 
Further, in making the recommendation for creating 
enforceable agreement, the Task Force provided for that 
enforceability as long as four main conditions were met: 
 
1. the child must have emotional ties with the birth 
parent or birth relatives; 
 
2. the adoptive parent(s), the birth parent(s), or birth 
relative(s) seeking communication, contact, or 
visitation and the adoption agency (if any) must enter 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Brooks Hunter, supra note 159, at 116–18. 
 186. Id. at 113–14. 
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into a notarized written agreement before the issuance 
of a final adoption decree; 
 
3. the court must determine the agreement is in the best 
interests of the child; and 
 
4. the court must incorporate the terms of the agreement 
into a written order.187 
 
The Task Force went on to state that it wanted to 
make sure that the open adoption agreement did not 
become a means whereby a birth parent or birth relative 
could not undermine the adoptive parent(s)’ authority to 
decide what is best for their adoptive child . . . . Among 
other things, the Interagency Task Force is concerned 
that making open adoption agreements legally binding 
will undermine the child’s sense of security and 
permanence within the adoptive family.  However, the 
Task Force’s reason for recommending that open 
adoption agreements be made legally enforceable is to 
enhance the child’s sense of security by providing a way to 
preserve the child’s emotional ties with relatives and birth 
parents if it is in the child’s best interests.188 
In reacting to the recommendations of the Task Force, the 
Minnesota Legislature passed in 1997,189 and later amended in 
1998, a statute on “communication or contact agreements.”190  This 
statute provided for the ability of the parties to enter into a written 
agreement that would be memorialized in a court order evidencing 
an agreement for ongoing contact between the adoptive parents, 
the child, and the birth parents or other relatives.191  The purpose 
of the contact agreement is to lay out the nature of contacts so that 
the court can determine if the contacts are in the child’s best 
interest.192 
Several significant issues are clear under the enforceable 
 
 187. Id. at 114. 
 188. Id. at 114–15. 
 189. 1997 Minn. Laws 787–88 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (Supp. 1997) 
(amended 1998, 1999, 2006)). 
 190. 1998 Minn. Laws 586 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (1998) (amended 
1999, 2006)). 
 191. MINN. STAT. § 259.58(a) (1998) (current version at MINN. STAT.                 
§ 259.58(a) (2006)). 
 192. See id. 
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contact agreement and contact order.  The first is that the contact 
order is, in fact, enforceable.193  It is enforceable in family court; 
even though the records in juvenile court are closed without a 
court order, it nevertheless can be filed in the family court for 
purposes of that enforcement.194 
Before going into court, all parties are required to participate 
in mediation to attempt to settle any differences that might exist as 
a result of the attempt to enforce the terms of the court order.195 
Of critical note, however, are the restrictions of the 
enforceability.  More specifically, the statute indicates that: 
Failure to comply with the terms of an agreed order 
regarding communication or contact that has been 
entered by the court under this section is not grounds for: 
(1)  setting aside an adoption decree; or 
(2)  revocation of a written consent to an adoption after 
that consent has been irrevocable.196 
Thus, the contact agreement does not provide the ability to 
question the underlying adoption.197  While it will influence 
ongoing contact and communication, it neither intends nor 
operates to provide a basis for questioning the ongoing legal rights 
of the adoptive parents to parent the child.198 
With this restriction, the enforceable contact agreement and 
order has further reflected the change in attitudes about “family” 
and how families are created and defined.  Notwithstanding this 
statute and the current attitude in favor of contact agreements, 
there have been questions recently raised by the Evan B. 
Donaldson Institute.199  In a recent report, questions were raised 
regarding the efficacy of counseling on behalf of birth parents 
leading to adoption and enforceable contact agreements.200  
 
 193. Id. § 259.58(c). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. § 259.58(b). 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. For general information on the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 
see http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/index.php. 
 200. SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., 
SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING OF BIRTHPARENTS IN THE ADOPTION 
PROCESS 31–33 (Adam Pertman ed. 2007) (writing that states vary in the quantity, 
timing, and substance of counseling, which may lead to uninformed decisions in 
the adoption process, thereby undermining the enforceability of contact 
agreements). 
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Nevertheless, the current view held by most is that open adoption is 
the best option available for adoption.201 
D. Open Adoption Records—The Last Frontier 
The open adoption concept, as it applies not only to adoption, 
but also to the creation of families and the “rights” of persons to 
know about their backgrounds and heritage, has swept through 
virtually every issue.  The remaining frontier of that argument has 
to do with the availability of adoption records.  This is a continuing 
controversy, which has become hotly contested and debated in a 
number of states, and it is currently a subject of continuing 
discussion at the Minnesota Legislature.  From a historical 
perspective, 
[t]he central issue igniting the Adoption Rights 
Movement in 1971 was the inability of adopted persons to 
gain access to information about their birth families 
contained in adoption case records.  Institutional 
custodians of adoption records—courts, hospitals, and 
adoption agencies—citing state statutes, some more than 
a half century old, refused to divulge any family 
information to adopted persons or birthparents searching 
for their biological kin.  As early as 1917 Minnesota 
enacted legislation closing adoption records to public 
inspection, and other states soon followed.  By 1943, 
spurred on by reformers wanting to protect the child born 
out of wedlock from the stigma of illegitimacy, 23 states 
had passed similar legislation sealing adoption records.  
By the early 1970s, sealed records had become a standard, 
if not universal, feature of the adoption process, but they 
had also achieved a seeming immutability that belied the 
past from which they emerged. 
Not surprisingly, adoption rights activists assume that 
adoption records have always been sealed and that 
adoption agency officials have always been uncooperative 
in providing members of the adoption triad—adoptive 
parents, birthparents, and adoptive persons—with family 
information . . . . But in fact, none of these assumptions is 
 
 201. See id. at 10–12, 39, 50 (suggesting that open adoption best facilitates 
growth and fairness for the child, well-being for the birthparents by reducing 
regret, grief, and worry, and well-being, security, and comfort for the adopting 
parents). 
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historically accurate.202 
Despite historical analysis reflecting that not all adoption 
records have always been closed, or that all states have had closed 
or sealed records, the history in Minnesota and the current 
statutory view is for closed or confidential records.203  In fact, with 
the changes that have occurred in other areas of law, the sealing 
and confidentiality of adoption records reflect perhaps the most 
security of any records that are sealed.  Even the adoptive parents 
must get a court order to open their own file once it has been 
sealed at the conclusion of the adoption.  For this reason, as 
previously noted, even the contact order required and allowed by 
statute is filed in Family Court in a separate proceeding and not in 
Juvenile Court, since those files and records are closed.  More 
specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 259.79 states as follows: 
259.79 Adoption records 
Subdivision 1.  Content. 
(a) The adoption records of the commissioner’s 
agents and licensed child-placing agencies shall 
contain copies of all relevant legal documents, 
responsibly collected genetic, medical and social 
history of the child and the child’s birth parents, the 
child’s placement record, copies of all pertinent 
agreements, contracts, and correspondence relevant 
to the adoption, and copies of all reports and 
recommendations made to the court. 
(b) The commissioner of human services shall 
maintain a permanent record of all adoptions 
granted in district court in Minnesota regarding 
children who are: 
(1)  under guardianship of the commissioner or 
a licensed child-placing agency according to 
section 260C.201, subdivision 11, or 260C.317; 
(2)  placed by the commissioner, commissioner’s 
agent, or licensed child-placing agency after a 
consent to adopt according to section 259.24 or 
under an agreement conferring authority to 
 
 202. E. Wayne Carp, The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy in Historical 
Perspective: The Case of the Children’s Home Society of Washington,1895–1988, J. OF SOC. 
AND SOC. WELFARE vol. 19, No. 2 (1992), at 27–57 in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION 
READER, supra note 2, at 126. 
 203. MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subdiv. 1(c) (2006). 
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place for adoption according to section 259.25; 
or 
(3)  adopted after a direct adoptive placement 
approved by the district court under section 
259.47. 
Each record shall contain identifying information 
about the child, the birth or legal parents, and 
adoptive parents, including race where such data is 
available.  The record must also contain 
(1) the date the child was legally free for 
adoption; 
(2) the date of the adoptive placement; 
(3) the name of the placing agency; 
(4) the county where the adoptive placement 
occurred; 
(5) the date that the petition to adopt was filed; 
(6) the county where the petition to adopt was 
filed; 
(7) the date and county where the adoption 
decree was granted. 
(c)  Identifying information contained in the 
adoption record shall be confidential and shall be 
disclosed only pursuant to section 259.61. 
Subdivision 2.  Use. 
Each adoption record shall constitute the permanent 
record upon which court action is based and agency 
services are administered. 
Subdivision 3. Retention; records made public. 
All adoption records shall be retained on a 
permanent basis under a protected record system 
which ensures confidentiality and lasting 
preservation.  All adoption records shall become 
public records on the 100th anniversary of the 
granting of the adoption decree.204 
By way of general background, in Minnesota, 
[t]here is a legal presumption that court records and 
records of court administrators are open to any member 
 
 204. Id. § 259.79. 
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of the public for public inspection . . . . However, court 
adoption records are inaccessible to the public pursuant 
to the limitations contained the in Rules of Public Access 
to Records of the Judicial Branch.205 
Further, as noted above, by statute directly related to 
adoptions, “[a]ll agency adoption records are confidential and 
permanent and must be retained under a protected system.  
Adoption records become public records on the 100th anniversary 
of the granting of the adoption decree.”206 
Perhaps most controversial is the issue of retroactively opening 
all of those records.  That question has come under great scrutiny 
in the last few years.  In arguments from Oregon to Tennessee, 
legislatures have retroactively opened the adoption records.207  
Those statutory decisions have withstood numerous state and 
federal attacks on everything from statutory interruption to 
constitutional grounds. 
In addition to the changing attitudes toward “open adoption” 
that have fueled this controversy, there are basic legal issues that 
have been argued as well. 
The continuing controversy over the confidentiality of 
adoption records illustrates the inadequacy of existing 
constitutional law doctrine to address issues involving 
children and their families . . . . As they mature, adoptees 
often seek information about their biological families, 
including their original birth certificates.  Constitutional 
law has proved to be an awkward vehicle for articulating 
and evaluating the claims of adoptees to information 
about their biological families.  Courts have unsuccessfully 
attempted to balance the rights of adoptees against those 
of their biological and adoptive parents, rather than 
recognizing and attempting to mediate the overlapping 
identity issues at stake.208 
 
 205. SILBERBERG, supra note 9, at 115.  See also Rules of Public Access to 
Records of the Judicial Branch, R. 2 (1988) (amended 2005). 
 206. SILBERBERG, supra note 9, at 117–18.  See also MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subdiv. 
3; Tibitts v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); 
Minnesota DHS Reg. 9560.0180(3) (2006). 
 207. See, e.g., Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Cawood, 
134 S.W.3d 159, 167 (Tenn. 2004) (indicating that the trend is toward a policy of 
openness in regard to public records, including adoption records). 
 208. Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case 
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150 (1999), in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN 
ADOPTION READER, supra note 2, at 153. 
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In efforts to open sealed records without statutory change, 
cases have been brought claiming a violation of the constitutional 
rights of adoptees on various grounds. 
In the most widely cited case brought by adoptees (Alma 
Soc’y Inc., v. Melon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979)), the 
Second Circuit rejected the adoptees’ claim that their 
“personhood” entitled them to open birth records.  The 
plaintiff adoptees argued that the New York statutes 
providing for sealed adoption records violated the Due 
Process Clause because the adoptees were constitutionally 
entitled to the information contained in the records . . . . 
The court noted that the adoptees’ request implicated the 
interests of two “families,” the biological family and the 
adoptive family.  Drawing on Supreme Court cases 
addressing the importance of an intact family, 
notwithstanding the claims of a biological father, the 
Second Circuit recognized significant interests of the 
adoptive families which might be “adversely affected” 
through disclosure of the names of the biological 
parents.209 
With the resulting failure to get records opened on court 
challenge, adoptees turned their efforts to the legislative arena and 
have worked hard to change the statutes that initially closed the 
files.  That continues to be the effort in Minnesota.  Currently, 
available evidence suggest[s] that open records regimes 
[do not] compromise the integrity of the adoption 
process.  Indeed, as Professor Joan Hollinger observes, 
more than 80% of the biological mothers who have 
relinquished children for adoption in Michigan since 
1980 have consented to the disclosure of their identity 
when their children become adults . . . . Moreover, 
whatever constitutionally protected interests adoptive 
parents may have in controlling a child’s access to 
information while the child is a minor weakens 
considerably once a child reaches majority.210 
In a continuing irony, 
adoption law increasingly mandates extensive disclosure 
of non-identifying genetic information, while resisting the 
calls for disclosure of identifying information.  This 
practice of fully disclosing anonymous genetic 
 
 209. Id. at 154. 
 210. Id. at 155. 
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information, with corresponding secrecy of the identity of 
the person, seems itself to be an example of genetic 
essentialism.  A primary rationale for requiring disclosure 
of non-identifying genetic information is to enable 
prospective adoptive parents to guard against any dangers 
that might be posed through “faulty” genes.  By contrast, 
the purpose of disclosing the identity of biological 
relatives is to aid adoptees and parents in their personal 
and emotional development, though providing genetic 
information may be a by-product.  Knowing the identity of 
her biological parents may help the adoptee in her 
identity development, but is certainly not the only factor 
in that development.211 
Thus, while the dam of closed records continues to be solid in 
Minnesota, the oncoming tidal wave sweeping across the country—
including in Minnesota—is likely to break it down in the relatively 
near future.  Legal and social arguments begin to fall, and as more 
study occurs regarding the whole context of openness in adoptions, 
it is likely that this prohibition as well as the others discussed 
previously will be left in the wake of the new attitude toward 
adoption.212 
V. CONCLUSION 
To say that adoption has undergone a revolution in attitude 
and legal treatment in the last twenty-five years is in no way an 
exaggeration.  From the days when adoption agencies had a 
monopoly on how children were placed and how families were 
formed, we now find ourselves in a much more egalitarian situation 
where decisions about forming families are left to the individuals, 
rather than agencies or the government. 
No longer are we in the days when an adoption agency had 
birth parents coming in one door and dropping the child into a 
“black hole,” while a group of social workers made decisions on 
who the appropriate adoptive parents were, based on 
unannounced criteria that were constantly shifting.  In what now is 
a much more transparent “open” process and procedure, decisions 
regarding children and their best interests are primarily left to 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., H.F. 2753, 2004 Leg., 83d Sess. (Minn. 2004) (proposing to give a 
person who is adopted on or after August 1, 2005, and is at least 19 years old, 
access to the original birth record, on request, from the Department of Health). 
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persons concerned about individual children, rather than 
bureaucracy of agencies or government. 
With this new “openness” come new attitudes, rights, and 
responsibilities of all of the participants.  The ultimate question of 
what is in a child’s “best interests” is yet to be determined and will 
continually change as society’s view of children and families shifts.  
Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that it is difficult to envision the 
situation in which too many adults “love” a child and are concerned 
enough to contribute to that child’s “best interests.”  The next 
fifteen to twenty years will tell us, as these children grow to 
maturity, what the impact of this revolution has been. 
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